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Summary
The research reported in this book aims to explain why different people get difïerent jobs
and incomes. It is an investigation into allocation mechanisms on the labor market, and
an elaboration for two different labour market segments. These segments differ in institu-
tional arrangements, but can be compared in required qualifications of ttre personnel: the
paid informal market for child minding, and the institutionalize<l child care cenLcrs.
In chapter one it is argued that a specificalion of allocation mechudsms is needed
for the explanation of the allocation. Thc neo-classical model and the credentialist theories
offersuch models, but these aren'[ satisfactory. The neo-classical modcl is relatively sim-
ple imd elegant, but has a problem in short-term explanation, because of difficulties in the
measurement of productivity. The credentialist heories are the sociological altemative ,
but they deny any connection between the productivity of the worker and labour market
allocation. An elaboration which seems to contain best of both kinds of theory construc-
tion can be found in Thurow's wage and job competition models. In thc wagc compctition
model the price mechanism on thc labour market is very flexible, so that adjustrnens in
wages for different human capital characteristics arc easily made. In the job competition
model wages are coupled with jobs, and jobs are divided among heterogcneous workers. It
is expected that. selcctors rank applicants according to expected training costs in a labour
queue. The rigidity of wages is explained in three different, mutually rivalling ways. In
the Íirst explanation the wages are rigid because the productivity is in the job and not in
the man. In the second explanation rigidity of wages is necessary for reducing training
costs. In the third, barely elaborated explanation, wages are rigid becau.se productivity
is difficult to measure and wage differentials are based on considerations of faimess. In
the remaining part of chapter one, the main innovations of the job competition model in
comparison to the neo-classical model are subjected to critical examination. It is argued
that the job competition model lacks a theory of jobs and job structures, is contradictory
and incomplete in ils wage theory and is incomplete in its elaboration of the matching
process on the labour market. Though the wage and job competition models are put to
empirical tests, a more complex model of the allocation process is elaborated.
In chaptertwo such a selection model is verbally elaborated. It is argued that labour
relations are weak solidarity relations, in which each contract parmer strives for his own
individual benefits without causing damage to the other. In such weak solidarity rclations
the exchange principle is equity, that is division of benefits according to contributions.
Another characteristic of weak solidarity relations is the intertwined exchange of person-
bound and general means of exchange. Person-bound means of exchange are investments
in relations that cost time. The most important general exchange medium is money. In
most employment contrac$, which are per definition long-term contracts, it is difficult to
specify all efforts of the contract par0ners exactly, and impossible to foresee all changes in
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the environment of the employment relation. To prevent oppornrnistic behaviour, which
causes damage, it is necessary to use additional means to govem the relation. The em-
ployer will use the means of control or investments in a trust relation. A control theory of
employment relations is elaborated, in which it is hypothesized that control on input or
output is a means of restricting opportunistic behaviour. Control can stimulate motivation,
but is only applicable as far as the costs of control do not exceed benefits. When output
or effort are difficult to measure, the employer will try to establish a trust relation with
the employee. ln the employment relation-signalling theory, it is elaborated that trust can
be established by making a sacrifice or offering a glft. The employer can use money or
person-bound means of exchange to bind the employee, preferring the use of money al-
tematives. On the basis of the control and relation signalling theories of labour relations,
a job structure theory is elaborated. It is argued that jobs are part of relational structures,
which are the product of the efficient division of labour. Division of labour increases total
organizational production, because of differentiation and specialization, but also has costs
in demand for coordination and control. In the hierarchical job structure these tasks, which
contain a larger measure of uncertainty than the performing work, are concentrated in the
higher job levels. It is argued that, as an effect of the pyramid fbrm of job structures, ttre
contribution of higher level employees to total organizational production is larger as the
hierarchical evel of work is higher. This explains wage differentials between different hi-
erarchical evels and the strategic importance of the quality of higher level employees for
the organization. In the remaining part of chapter two the selection model is elaborated in
its consequences for selection and wage determination in isolated employment relations,
organizational employment relations, and for differences in allocation and compensation
between different organizations. An important additional implication is that larger orga-
nizations, because of higher organizational costs, will select better educated employees
and pay higher wages.
In chapterthree it is argued that the labour markets for child care are excellent test-
ing grounds for the wage and job competition models and the selection model. The tasks
of the performing personnel are comparable among the segments, Íhough the labour mar-
ket segments have very different structural characteristics. The informal market consists
of unpaid services provided by family members, friends or neighbours, and paid services
by market contacts. Especially when weekly demand is relatively large, a market solution
for child care is preferred. The most popular market solutions for the child care problem
are the child minder for the own private family, and child care centers. It is asserted that
the supply of child care centers undergoes aprofessionalization process. The demand side
of the market is interested in high quality services; the supply side of the market for child
care tries to improve quality of services by increasing quality requiremens for equipment
of centers and personnel. As a consequence of the professionalization process the services
of child care are brought on a higher quality level, and among institutions homogenized.
In chapter four the selection modei is elaborated for the informal and institution-
alized child care labour market segments. It is argued that child care is a good with cre-
dence characteristics, that control of workers in child care is only partially possible, and
that therefore trust relations between employer and employee have to be established. In
the informal child care, during the recruitment and selection process the employer has to
make trade-offs between qualities of the child minder, characteristics of the desired re-
lation and the use of different meaÍrs of exchange. Characteristics of the candidate child
minder will be evaluated in terms of competence in handling children and uncertainty,
loyalty (dedication to the job) in terms of motivation and expected duration in the job, ho-
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mogeneity (correspondence to the family's culture) and costs. The ultimate decision made
depends on resources. For instance, for the selection criterium educational level it is ex-
pected that high income demand will choose a higher level candidate because of greater
competence (in handling uncertainty) and (potentially) better performance. Homogeneity
and monetary costs (within certain bounds) will not be very important. The choice of a
higher level candidate will be checked when job duration is long. High income demand
will bind the child minder by paylng larger hourly wages than the market rate. hw income
demand will bind the child minderby person-bound means of exchange. High educational
level candidates are attractive because of greater competence in handling uncertainty, but
considerations of homogeneity and (monetary) costs are also very important. So low in-
come demand will tend to choose a high level child minder because of greater competence
and bener performance, but as important considerations are homogeneity, in the sense of
correspondence to the family's culture, and the own educational level of the educators,
and the monetary costs. As for high income demand, low income demand will not choose
a higher level child minder in a long-term job. If, after all, a high level child minder is
chosen, low income demand will spend a relatively large amount of time on social con-
tact with the child minder, and maybe some extra monetary cost on the hourly wage of
the child minder. The upshot of the elaboration of the selection model in this chapter is
that hypotheses are formulated on wages and allocation on this particular labour market
segment. It is expected that wages will be quite rigid, differentiating only within a small
margin around the market wage. Furthermore it is expected that there will be correlations
between incomes of child care demanders and wage of the child minder. Positive correla-
tions are also expected between the hourly wage rate and the educational level of the child
minder. Low income demand will pay relatively lower wages, will differentiate even less
in pay, and invest a larger amount of time in their child minder, especially when she has
bener qualifications.
In the institutionalized sector it is expected fhat employment relations are to a large
extent under the spell of the professionalization process. In contrast o the very personal
trust relations between educator and child minder, the centers will try to establish collec-
tive trust relations between supply and demand. For the supply side of the market, this
meaÍrs that every center will strive for qualitatively good services, to establish in the mar-
ket a good reputation. The professionalized centers organize the supply side of the market
to produce homogeneous ervices and to reduce search costs for the demand side. It is ex-
pected that the child care centers will anange their job structures according to the goal of
good reputation, but in accordance with job structure theory. It is expected that in a small
child center with one paid child care worker per group no hierarchical differentiation will
come into existence. In a child care center with two persons working per group one per-
son will take coordinating and controlling tasks. As the child center grows in size, as a
product of the division of labour, coordinating and controlling tasks will be concentrated
in the higher levels of the job hierarchy. An extra job level will be added when the child
center is one of a number under the same board. On the performing level minimal and
maximal standards for educational requirements will be set. They are the guarantee that
qualitatively good personnel is selected, and are at the basis of the collective trust rela-
tions. Therefore it is expected that not only cducational level but also educational training
is imponant in the selection process. Because of the fast pace of the professionalization
process and the expected emphasis in selection on educational credentials, experience is
not expected to be important in the selection process. Ascriptive charactcristics uch as sex
and age are not expected to be important in the selection process. As far as the higher level
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jobs are concemed, the demand will be for increasing job level. It is expected that pay is
primarily dependent on job level: the higher the job level, the more pay. This is a kind of
relation signalling for strategic jobs in the organization. Next to job level, monetary rela-
tion signals will also be given for investments done in surplus educational credentials and
seniority. On thc aggregate level it is expected that higher credentials will be paid more
for Lwo reasons. The first is that the higher qualiÍied workers will occupy the higher po-
sitions in the job structure. The sccond is that there will be relation-signalling for surplus
educational credentials in the samc job. On the level of the institutions differences be-
tween them are expected. It is expected that more professionalized institutions are larger,
because of their bctter reputation. They will have a higher level of pay, and can therefore
anract bener qualified persomel and more subsidies. The less profèssionalized centers
will take thc professionalized centcrs as refercnce point, but lack Íinancial resources to
make arrangements according to professional standards. In these small centers probably
not only educational credentials but also the embcdding in value-communities, as local or
religious communities, will be important in establishing trust and binding personnel.
In chapter five the data collection method is rcported. The empirical analysis is
based on samples of child minder demand and child care centers. Child minder demand
was traced by examining advertisemenls, ecking a child minder. Of 239 questionnaires
sent to child care demanders, mostly after telephonic approval of the respondent, 179 were
rctumed. Thc child care centers sample was a list of all known institutions for child care
in the provincc of Groningen. On the total of 175,114 were rerumed.
The hypotheses conceming the paid informal rclations, elaborated Íiom the se-
lcction model, are testcd in chaptcr six, with explanations based on the wage and job
compctition models as rivals. It is found that wagcs are quite rigid, and only flcxible in
a small range around thc market wage of 5 guilders. There are clear indications that this
market wage is above the markct clcaring ratc, becausc a largc number of applicants react
to advertisements. No indication is found that the wage depends on (short-term) supply
and demantl. The only supply characteristic that is relcvant in wage determination is ed-
ucational Ievel of the candidate, and this characteristic explains only a small part of wagc
variation. Job characteristics are more important for wage determination. If housc work
has to be done, or when more children have to be taken care of, pay is better. A large
amount of variance in hourly wage is explained by the incomcs of the demand side. When
the income is largc, relation-signals are given for a higher educational level of the chosen
applicants (probably to motivate thcm), and for longer job duration. Such signals are not
found for low income demand in the data. Thcrc are indications that.low income demand
chooses their child minder more homogeneously and less dominantly in comparison to
their own educational level, that they invest more time in social exchange (especially col-
fce drinking) with their child minder, and that they labe l the relation less as an employment
relation, and more as a personal relation with a kind of added family member, a friend or an
acquaintance. As far as the matter of flexibility is concemcd, no indications are found that
wage flexibility is large, and strongly influenced by supply characteristics. The amount
of Ílexibility is largely determined by thc individual demand, and hardly dependent on
characteristics or behaviour of the supply sidc. Educational level is important for adjust-
ments in ttre wage offer, but adjustments are mostly only a matter of the employer's own
decision. The upshot of these analyses is that both wage and job competition are unsat-
isfactory models in comparison to the sclection model. The wage competition model is
unsatisfactory because on this unregulated labor market segment wages hardly appear to
depend on the ratio of supply and demand and on supply characteristics, i.e. the humem
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capital of the child minder. Flexibility has no direct influence on entrance chances. The
job competition model is in this context unsatisfactory, because it can't explain the cor-
relation between supply side characteristics, uch as educational level, and hourly wage.
Furthermore the explanation that wages are rigid because of training costs is in the context
of these isolated labour relations not salient.
In chapter seven the expectatioÍrs conceming the labour market segment in insti-
rutionalized child care are put to the test, with wage and job competition, credentialist
theories and the demand-supply model as rivalling explanatory models. The existence of
hierarchical evels in the center depends strongly on the number of people working per
group. With two people working per group a large chance of hierarchical structuring of
jobs exists. If the center is one of a number of centers under the same board, ttre chzurce
of an additional hierarchical ayer is large. Indirectly ttre number of hierarchical evels
depends on the number of workers in the child center. It is Íbund that educational level,
educational direction and job level are important in determining wage. Even more im-
portant than these characteristics is the collective wage aÍrangement. The collective wage
arrangements differ per group of centers, and corresponds roughly to the level of profes-
sionalization. The wage aÍrangements have job level as primary compcnsation principle,
while in the more developed aÍrangements extra monetary compensation is also given for
surplus educational credentials, seniority and age. Allocation is largely dependent on jobs
and wage aÍrangements. The best explanatory mechanism Íbr allocation of educational
level is job level. The number of high hierarchical levels is rationed by the efficiency of
the division of labour. It is found that forthe allocation of educational level credentials, the
best explanatory mechanism is the munrally rationed supply of high level jobs and high
level educational credential holders. This principle explains allocation better lhan refer-
ence matches on preferential educational credentials criteria, or matches based on wages
and educational credentials. Furthermore, it is found that the allocation between centers
differs. The more professionalized centers are larger, have a higher monetary compensa-
tion level, and attract, for the same job, better qualified personnel. The less professional-
ized centers are smaller, have difficulties in keeping to professional standards, pay lower
wages, and have difficulties attracting well qualified personnel. These results correspond
to a large extent to expectations based on Íhe selection model. Rivalling explanatory mod-
els explain less, and less well. The wage competition model is unsatisfactory, because this
market segment lacks almost all short-term wage flexibility, and lacks explanations for
the effects of job levels and wage aÍrangements on wages. The job competition model not
only lacks a theory of job structure, but is also unsatisfactory in the explanation of wagc
differentials for people in the same jobs, for instance according to educational credentials
and collective wage arrangements. The explanation of wage stickiness because of train-
ing costs in this context is also unsatisfactory because most skills are acquired in school.
The supply-demand model, which is a matching model that explains wage differentials
as interaction effects of job and worker characteristics, is unsatisfactory because wages
correspond much more closely to jobs than to supply characteristics. Funhermore, the
matching of educational credentials corresponds more closely to jobs ttran to wage lev-
els pcr se, as would be expected in the supply-demand model. The credentialist heory is
unsatisfactory because it is not educational credentials itself that are rewarded, but better
pay is given to frose who are expected to pcrform bencr.
In sum, it is concluded that a model that includes govemance structures of the
employment relation add to the explanation of the results of selection and allocation pro-
cesses on the labour market. Simple models, such as the wagc iind job competition modcls,
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that equate productivity, wages and human capital cannot explain short-term processes in
the labour market well. More complex models that elaborate on govemance structures
of the employment relation and ttrat can incorporate speciÍic aspects of different jobs do
much bener in the explanation of structural characteristics of labour market (segments)
and the results of the allocation process.
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